I (re)finished two Latour essays this morning, “A Cautious Prometheus” and “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?”.

A passage in the latter stood out to me, where he describes something he calls “critical barbarity”. This is most certainly a phenomenon, I’ve seen too much of in the last decade, when critique gathered steam and inflated a great many people with hot air. Today people who haven’t cracked a philosophy or sociology book in a decade or more run around dismissing all kinds of things as “constructions” (for instance money, race, sex), while invoking indisputable fact (for instance, history, physics, critical theory) to justify the necessity of all kinds of ideological intrusions.

The selective skepticism and credulousness can seem like hypocrisy, but I believe it is truly innocent. And not only innocent; for all its talk of critical self-awareness, it is naive.

Latour describes how this naivety is maintained:

…the cruel treatment objects undergo in the hands of what I’d like to call critical barbarity is rather easy to undo. If the critical barbarian appears so powerful, it is because the two mechanisms I have just sketched are never put together in one single diagram. Antifetishists debunk objects they don’t believe in by showing the productive and projective forces of people; then, without ever making the connection, they use objects they do believe in to resort to the causalist or mechanist explanation and debunk conscious capacities of people whose behavior they don’t approve of. The whole rather poor trick that allows critique to go on, although we would never confine our own valuables to their sordid pawnshop, is that there is never any crossover between the two lists of objects in the fact position and the fairy position. This is why you can be at once and without even sensing any contradiction (1) an antifetishist for everything you don’t believe in — for the most part religion, popular culture, art, politics, and so on; (2) an unrepentant positivist for all the sciences you believe in — sociology, economics, conspiracy theory, genetics, evolutionary psychology, semiotics, just pick your preferred field of study; and (3) a perfectly healthy sturdy realist for what you really cherish — and of course it might be criticism itself, but also painting, bird-watching, Shakespeare, baboons, proteins, and so on.

If you think I am exaggerating in my somewhat dismal portrayal of the critical landscape, it is because we have had in e?ect almost no occasion so far to detect the total mismatch of the three contradictory repertoires — antifetishism, positivism, realism — because we carefully manage to apply them on different topics. We explain the objects we don’t approve of by treating them as fetishes; we account for behaviors we don’t like by discipline whose makeup we don’t examine; and we concentrate our passionate interest on only those things that are for us worthwhile matters of concern.

But of course such a cavalier attitude with such contradictory repertoires is not possible for those of us, in science studies, who have to deal with states of a?airs that fit neither in the list of plausible fetishes—because everyone, including us, does believe very strongly in them—nor in the list of undisputable facts because we are witnessing their birth, their slow construction, their fascinating emergence as matters of concern. The metaphor of the Copernican revolution, so tied to the destiny of critique, has always been for us, science students, simply moot. This is why, with more than a good dose of field chauvinism, I consider this tiny field so important; it is the little rock in the shoe that might render the routine patrol of the critical barbarians more and more painful.

At the end of the essay Latour proposes a new critical attitude, which to me looks an awful lot like the attitude held by designers at their mature best:

The solution lies, it seems to me, in this promising word “gathering” that Heidegger had introduced to account for the “thingness of the thing.” …What is presented here is entirely different attitude than the critical one, not a flight into the conditions of possibility of a given matter of fact, not the addition of something more human that the inhumane matters of fact would have missed, but, rather, a multifarious inquiry launched with the tools of anthropology, philosophy, metaphysics, history, sociology to detect how many participants are gathered in a thing to make it exist and to maintain its existence. Objects are simply a gathering that has failed — a fact that has not been assembled according to due process. The stubbornness of matters of fact in the usual scenography of the rock-kicking objector — “It is there whether you like it or not” — is much like the stubbornness of political demonstrators: “the U.S., love it or leave it,” that is, a very poor substitute for any sort of vibrant, articulate, sturdy, decent, long-term existence. A gathering, that is, a thing, an issue, inside a Thing, an arena, can be very sturdy, too, on the condition that the number of its participants, its ingredients, nonhumans as well as humans, not be limited in advance.

The point here is that each person involved in a matter of concern will bring their own things they believe in more or less, practices and courses of action they prefer more or less, have their own epistemological standards determining what to them seems more or less true and relevant. To determine in advance what will be gathered or not only undermines the sturdiness of what results from the process of bringing social reality into existence.

Cultivating alignment is half the work of solving problems. When we behave as if those who are not already aligned with our way of understanding and acting are interfering with solving the problems we face it exposes a deeper problem: we do not understanding what a political problem is. A political problem is first and foremost an alignment problem! No wonder we can’t solve it — we literally do not know what we are doing.

It is natural for technocrats to confuse technical problems with political ones, but it appears this is no longer going to work. Technocrats will have to forget their expertise bias and relearn politics before we will make any more collective progress.

I’ve heard Marxists quip that “It’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism,” implying that anyone who wishes to preserve capitalism lacks the imagination to want something better. But is limitation of imagination the only reason a person might have a conservative desire to defend capitalism?

I see at least two alternative explanations.

First, pro-capitalist conservatives might actually have better imaginations — at least different imaginations — better able to imagine what might go wrong if we make radical changes to the world.

Second, it could be due to an acute awareness of imagination’s limits. We can imagine utopic or dystopic outcomes of change, but in my experience, the future often unfolds in ways nobody imagined. Our imagination always omits crucial considerations that lead to unintended, unimagined consequences.

This is why I prefer reform. If we make slow, incremental changes, we are better able to foresee the consequences and to respond to the inevitable surprises . The greater the scale and speed of change, the less predictable it is and the harder it is to correct if things go off the rails.

A third important reason conservatives are skeptical of revolutions, economic and otherwise, is that conservatives believe societies develop organically, by complex, distributed, localized processes — far too complex for any expert or any group of experts to comprehend, however imaginative, insightful, knowledgable and intelligent they might be.

Experts can effectively influence and shape these organic processes. But the belief that they can create them from scratch is a sign of naive hubris. Friedrich Hayek called this “the fatal conceit.”

Obviously, I share all three of these mistrustful attitudes toward imagining radical futures.

Does this make me a conservative? It is relative. Compared to a revolutionary (whether a left radical or right reactionary), yes, I am conservative. But compared to people who think things are perfectly fine as they are, and therefore not requiring significant reform, then I look like a progressive, albeit a cautious one who respects conservatives. But I’m not so conservative that sensibly-paced, sensibly-scaled socialist solutions to social problems automatically horrify me.

But whatever else I am, I’m certainly anti-revolutionary.

Last week I threw a tantrum about segmentations. I was sick, and my mood was slightly overintense. I call it “vehement”, and it is bad for my writing. The idea I wrote about is important, and deserved better, so I want to try again.

I talked about a situation designers often face. To do our work effectively, we have to understand the people who will use the things we design.

But sometimes the people we’re designing for have diverging sets of requirements. Their needs might be different, or they might have different attitudes or behaviors or use what we are designing in different contexts. We find there is not one, but multiple ideal users, and if we design only for one user, the design is unlikely to work for the others.

(Don’t be distracted by the term “user”. This is an all-purpose term for a person for whom we design. The design field has been debating this term for decades, and I’m sick of this debate, this category of debate, and the kind of person who’s into this kind of debate, aka 15-years-ago me.)

Whenever we discover that we are designing not for one ideal user, but for multiple ideal users, we develop a design segmentation. Sometimes we will express the design segments as personas — representative fictional characters who help flesh out the segments and make them feel real to designers.

I will give a real life example. I was working for a telecom, helping them design a better billing system. But we discovered that, with respect to bill payment, customers fell into three categories. People who wanted to pay as little attention to their bill as possible and didn’t much care if something was weird on the bill if it wasn’t huge, people who were way into inspecting every bill line-by-line and disputing the crap out of anything that looked irregular by so much as a nickel, and people who were living paycheck to paycheck, juggling their bills and trying to orchestrate income and outflow of cash to keep their households afloat. These people wanted very different levels of detail in their bills, very different degrees of control and very different kinds of help if something goes wrong. We called these segments something like “Set-and-Forget”, “Bill Auditor” and “Paycheck-To-Paycheck”. A successful design solution would need to accommodate all three of these segments.

With this example in mind, imagine the frustration designers face when clients tell them they already have a segmentation, and that we will be required to use those.

Why?

• They have already made the investment, and it is wasteful to redo the work.
• We should build on what they’ve already done, so we can move things forward instead of going back to square one.
• It is important to maintain consistency. It will confuse people if every project uses different segments.
• Turf. “Marketing does segmentations and personas in this organization.”

Much of the time, marketing did the segmentation.

But marketing segments for marketing purposes, and often those purposes are different from ours and have no relevance to the design problem we are trying to solve.

Imagine, for example of our client had made us solve our billing problem with typical telecom marketing segments. I’m just going to make them up:

• Wire-Cutters: customers who live on wireless networks and stream everything.
• Cable-Connecteds: people who still need all their devices (TV, telephone, maybe computers) securely attached to a wall, via a cable, for some combination of entrenched habit and a perception of reliability.
• Sports Fans: people who care only about their sports and who’ll gladly pay for cable TV in order to see all their games.

Imagine trying to use these segments to solve the design problem of accommodating different bill paying preferences. Telecom marketing segments tell you a lot about media consumption habits and attitudes and incredibly little about bill paying.

The lesson here is that segmentations of people are always relative to some specific purpose. Again:

Segmentations of people are always relative to some specific purpose.

Another way to state it is that any schema for dividing up sets of people is useful for asking certain kinds of questions, and useless for asking other kinds of questions.

This principle is not only true of marketing and design segmentations.

It is equally true of personality types. A personality typology is psychological segmentations that might (or might not) be useful for answering questions pertaining to commonalities and differences among groups of people.

Myers-Briggs and Enneagram enthusiasts can sometimes succumb to seeing their models as capturing the essence of personalities. But that essence says more about the essence of typologist than the essence of the people they type. I can say all this as someone who actually experienced this essentialist lapse, and obsessively viewed the entire human world as a complex play of Jungian personality functions. I know this way of thinking from the inside.

But now I will get to my deeper and more urgent point: This principle applies most of all to political identity.

It is all-too-easy to essentialize political identities. It is even easier when we are equipped with sociological theories that claim these identities are the outcome of cultural processes that generate personhood. We aren’t just segmenting populations, now, we are defining the very mechanisms that produce personhood. Identity penetrates into the essence of people, and the commonalities and differences that unite and divide us as political actors.

But as with personality types, this belief about says more about the essence of the identitarian than the essence of the people they identify as belonging to one identity or another. It tells us how they understand society, culture, politics and personhood — and it also tells us how they understand themselves in relation to others.

Consider the extreme case of a white supremacist, who will insist that their identity is that of a white person, their identification with being white is far more indicative of who they are as a person than their status as a white person can possibly say. Is the white supremacist aware of this meta-identity and its significance to who they are? Usually not. Their understanding of the world has psychic roots deeper than the content of their belief. Their beliefs, and indeed, their perceptions, their animating logic, their feelings grow up from this depth and bloom as racist beliefs about themselves and others. They compulsively project this schema onto their thoughts, experiences, memories, expectations. They are imprisoned within them. And they become neurotically incapable of segmenting people in other ways that might be more relevant to resolving practical problems,

Our white supremacist has succumbed to the same rigid limitations as the marketing department we discussed earlier, or the Enneagram fanatic who must know your type right away. They’ve lost track of the purpose of their segmentation, and essentialized it as a natural structure of society or of customers or of human beings in general.

And this is true of not only right-wing identitarianism.

It is exactly as true of left-wing identitarianism also known as “woke”, and what I prefer to call progressivism.

Progressivism has essentialized its segmentation to such a degree that it seems incapable of thinking politics in any other way. Not only is its identity-centered way of thinking politics fixed, but the segmentation it has been using is fixed.

This has caused progressivists to address a second-generation Mexican Catholic who loves America, who struggles to afford rent and food, for whom social roles like mother, father, sister and brother are central to their conception of the world as POC, with essentially the same concerns as a keffiyeh-wearing trans Latinx graduate student in the Queer Studies program at an elite university. These two people probably want diametrically different things.

And if someone takes a fresh look at the diverse citizens of this nation and tries segmenting it by economic class, social values and levels of patriotism they’ll probably have a more compelling value proposition — at least to our working class, traditionalist Catholic patriot. I think there’s more of them than genderqueer anti-Western progressivist graduate students.

That segmentation will also probably work better for policy design than — let’s face it — the marketing segmentation developed by the Democratic National Committee for use in designing and disseminating progressivist marketing messages. If a school or criminal justice system, or public health system only analyzes, measures and addresses performance of people according to the DNC marketing segmentation, they’ll certainly find differences among segments. But if they were to try other segmentations — for instance income level — the differences that emerged might be dramatically sharper. Poor lives matter?

And with respect to last week’s Democrat defeat, if progressivists insist on — or just default to — compulsively relying on the progressivist identity segmentation to account for the loss, they’ll generate a heaps of hypotheses on attitudes of each DNC marketing segments toward people from other DNC marketing segments, and the answers produced through this process will be just as wrongheaded and out of touch as the ideas that lost the Democrats this election.

It is time we recover our recognition that people are, first and foremost, people, and that our beliefs about them are less about them than they are about ourselves. We have lost this understanding and it is harming our humanity and our ability to deal effectively with the human world around us.

I think this is better than my last two attempts. Certainly I’m less sick and less vehement. I’ll probably have to try a few more times to get this out right.

By the way, my segmentation of people is around their faiths and the ideologies that express those faiths. I see progressivists as an identity that trumps all other identities. Same with post-liberal trads, QAnons. Conservatives, Jewish Conservatives, Libertarians and old school liberals. These segments are far more meaningful to me than the identity schemas projected by each of these segments. I suppose today I’d call myself a metaliberal.