When a player-referee objection is made, the complaint is this: if one party in a dispute determines the norms governing the dispute itself and its resolution, the deliberation is no longer a dispute among equals. One party is “more equal than the others”.

This is especially true when the dispute is a normative one. In a normative dispute (for example, one over ethics or governing principles), if one party unilaterally decides the operative norms governing the resolution of that dispute, those procedural norms will favor some outcomes over others.

But if that same party also interprets and enforces its own procedural norms, the normative outcome is virtually controlled by one party.

Can we really believe that two teams compete on an even playing field if one team wrote the rulebook, carries the referee whistle, and revises the rules as needed in the course of the game?

And when the norms in question are fundamental values, this is when the stakes are highest. The values in question are existentially constitutive — that is, the values shape the experiences of the people in the dispute, and therefore their sense of what is true and right and reasonable. For many reasons, these matters are not conducive to factual debate. But this is exactly how naive realists approach them, making appeals to a common sense understanding that has yet to be established. They beg the meta-question.

This dynamic has doubtless destroyed many a marriage. Two naive kids enter wedlock, each with a sense of marital norms. Perhaps one adopted ideas of symmetrical fairness requiring each to share the same set of duties. Perhaps the other has adopted ideas of differentiated spousal roles. Each is convinced that their norms are the reasonable ones, because these norms include their own self-justification. Each sees the other’s justification as arbitrary and unreasonable.

But here is the crux of it: Every norm includes within it norms of justification. But these norms of justification are projected to an exterior position of transcendent authority, and from this illusory superior perch “objectively” ratify their own norm set as effectively absolute.

Unless someone has experienced life from multiple norms, and observed how with a shift of norms comes a shift of justifications and a shift of transcendent authority, the illusion is profoundly convincing. Opinions and theories about what is right and wrong are one thing, but proper procedures and criteria for deciding truth and fairness are quite another, so let’s get to work.

And tragically, precisely those who conform to dominant cultural norms are the ones least aware of such normative phenomena. Everything serves to reinforce the hegemonic illusion — from classroom rules, to everyday etiquette, to employee handbooks, to entertainment and news media — everyone knows what is true and right and reasonable — except for some crazy, evil folks. These are precisely the kind of people who once called marginal figures who dared to dissent “crazy and evil”, but we now know better than to treat marginal people this way. And it is terribly important to remember this lesson and to protect and hold space for marginal figures against unreasonable, bigoted, unreflective people who still — perhaps unconsciously — continue to dominate institutions and turn them into instruments of oppression. Such people must be de-centered — by force, if necessary — so everyone may participate.

Oh the irony! — if you have it.

For the last couple of days I have wondered if the player-referee objection can be thematized in terms of separation of powers. Legislators cannot deliberate as equals if one has powers transcending the deliberation itself — for example to summarily nullify or veto it, refuse to implement or enforce it. It seems possible, but something about it is unsettled and unsettling. I’m just noting this for future exploration.

I’m still re-rereading Richard J. Bernstein, and I think this is the problem Habermas has compulsively wrestled with for the better part of a century.