Whenever I want to know who someone is, I try to get them to talk about the people they hate. Whether in art or life, the depiction of villains demonstrates selfhood more than depiction of heroes.
Definitions de-finitize. They tell us what something is, by distinguishing it from what it is not. But we are most accustomed to third person definitions. How can a person seeing from the first person define my own self from the entire everything I enworld? “My” is somehow not first person, here, nor is “me”.
Me — first person object — is a deflected 3rd person who corresponds with I, first person subject.
Some people understand themselves only as first person object (me), while first person subject (I) is lost in oblivion.
Such people “look for themselves” but rarely \ask: who’s looking? They assume self is some kind of findable content instead of a container, a found thing instead of the finding agent, someone known instead of someone who knows — a thing among things within everything, not an everything of its own.
They are the I-less Mes.
A society of I-less Mes, also act as a We-less We who acts without detecting the We who acts.
They’ll each say “speaking as a…”, but they don’t realize there is a We who needs everyone to speak as a something. The political We remains as inconceivable as the Me who constitutes it.
Here even subjects are objects, but the real subject always remains preconceived.
I-less Me, Me-less I seem to attract, as do I-full Me and Me-full I.
These mind states are not essential. They are produced by how we think and act in the world. They are varieties of enworldment, and can be changed.
When enworldments change, miracles happen.